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law, it is suggested that colonisation can be best characterised as the imposition of
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this sense, this analysis inverts the legal origins and institutions literature. Given
that remnants of pre-colonial institutions persist, it is suggested that the type of pre-
colonial legal institution should have a direct effect on state crime control and the
crime rate. This is so, as societies that were relatively stateless prior to colonisation
are more likely to have high magnitude non-state sanctions that can act as sub-
stitutes for state punishments, but the presence of such non-state legal institutions
also reduces the productivity of state enforcement, contributing to an overall
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1 Introduction
Inspired by the research of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny
(LLSV)1 and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson,2 there has been a multitude of
cross-country empirical papers over the last 15 years that exploit differences
1 R. La Porta, F. López de Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 Journal of
Political Economy, no. 6 (1998), 1113-1155.
2 SeeD.Acemoglu, S. Johnson,and J.A.Robinson,TheColonialOrigins ofComparativeDevelopment:
AnEmpirical Investigation, 91 TheAmerican Economic Review, no. 5 (2001), 1369-1401; D.Acemoglu,
S. Johnson, and J.A. Robinson, Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the
ModernWorld IncomeDistribution, 117 The Quarterly Journal of Economics, no. 4 (2002), 1231-1294.
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in state institutions that were brought about by colonisation and their effect
on a range of development indicators. This article takes a different approach
by exploiting differences in pre-colonial institutions to investigate the impact
of non-state crime enforcement on state crime enforcement and the overall
level of crime.
While there is a complex relationship between crime and economic devel-
opment, many developing countries suffer from high crime rates that act as an
impediment to investment and economic growth.3 Perhaps more importantly,
however, high crime rates can seriously undermine the personal security and the
quality of life of those living in developing nations, and in this sense lower crime
can be seen as a development goal in itself.4
While much has been made of differences between civil and common law
legal transplants, comparative lawyers such as Michaels5 have argued that
there were often far bigger differences between the pre-colonial legal institu-
tions they aimed to replace. In relation to Western criminal law, all trans-
plants were based on individual responsibility, consistency of procedure,
proportionality, concepts of intent and disinterested state enforcement of
punishments. This is in contrast to the diverse range of pre-colonial legal
institutions that were encountered, and which are outlined below. Therefore,
in relation to criminal law, it is suggested that colonisation is better char-
acterised as the imposition of almost identical legal transplants on a diverse
range of pre-colonial legal institutions.
Based on the idea that elements of pre-colonial legal institutions continue to
persist in post-colonial societies, this article investigates the net effect of inter-
actions between state and non-state law enforcement – that is, legal pluralism.
This is done by exploiting differences in pre-colonial legal institutions using a
3 For a discussion of variations of crime rates across the world and their link to economic
development see R. Soares, Development, Crime and Punishment: Accounting for the
International Differences in Crime Rates, 73 Journal of Development Economics, no. 1 (2004),
155-184; J.H. Cole and A.M. Gramajo, Homicide Rates in a Cross Section of Countries: Evidence
and Interpretations, 35 Population and Development Review, no. 4 (2009), 749-776.
4 For an account of crime and its effects in the post-colonial world see J. Comaroff and J.L.
Comaroff (eds.), Law and Disorder in the Postcolony (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2006).
5 R. Michaels, The Second Wave of Comparative Law and Economics, 59 University of Toronto
Law Journal (2009), 1003-1069.
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dataset of 86 African, Asian and Pacific nations compiled by Müller et al.6 in
their Atlas of Pre-Colonial Societies. This research contributes to the small but
growing literature on pre-colonial institutions and economic development.7 In
this sense, it also adds to that of Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard who considered
the possibility of receptive and unreceptive legal transplants.8
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. First, there is a discus-
sion of legal pluralism and the persistence of pre-colonial institutions. Then
there is a description of different types of pre-colonial legal institutions and a
discussion of the potential interactions between state and non-state enforcement
activity and the likely overall effect on crime. Following on from this is an
outline of the empirical strategy and description of the data, followed by a
discussion of the econometric results. The conclusion highlights the key insights
gained from this investigation; the enduring importance of pre-colonial institu-
tions and the potential for negative interactions between state and non-state law
enforcement – a phenomenon termed legal dissonance.
6 H.P. Müller, C.K. Marti, E.S. Schiedt, and B. Arpagaus, Atlas vorkolonialer Gesellschaften:
Kulturelles Erbe und Sozialstrukturen der Staaten Afrikas, Asiens und Melanesiens (Berlin: Reimer,
2000), available at: <http://www.ethnomaps.ch/hpm-e/atlas-e.html>, accessed December 2012.
7 On pre-colonial institutions and economic development literature, see P. Ziltener and H.
Muller, The Weight of the Past Traditional Agriculture, Socio-Political Differentiation and
Modern Development in Africa and Asia: A Cross-National Analysis, 48 International Journal of
Comparative Sociology, no. 5 (2007), 371-415; N. Gennaioli and I. Rainer, The Modern Impact of
Precolonial Centralization in Africa, 12 Journal of Economic Growth, no. 3 (2007), 185-234 and S.
Michalopoulos and E. Papaioannou, Pre‐Colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African
Development, 81 Econometrica, no. 1 (2013), 113-152. It is suggested that this analysis makes a
significant extension to this growing literature, not only by analysing crime as opposed to
economic and governance indicators, but more importantly, by focusing on the interactions
between pre-colonial and (post) colonial institutions and their net effect. On the private
enforcement of crime literature, see W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner, Private Enforcement of
Law, 4 The Journal of Legal Studies, no. 1 (1975), 1-46; D. Friedman, Efficient Institutions for
the Private Enforcement of Law, 13 The Journal of Legal Studies, no. 2 (1984), 379-397; O. Ben-
Shahar and A. Harel, Blaming the Victim: Optimal Incentives for Private Precautions Against
Crime, 11 Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation, no. 2 (1995), 434-455; K.N. Hylton,
Optimal Law Enforcement and Victim Precaution, The Rand Journal of Economics (1996), 197-
206; A.K. Dixit, Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2007) and M.M. Coşgel, H. Etkes, and T.J. Miceli, Private Law
Enforcement, Fine Sharing, and Tax Collection: Theory and Historical Evidence, 80 Journal of
Economic Behaviour & Organization, no. 3 (2011), 546-552.
8 D. Berkowitz, K. Pistor, and J. Richard, Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant
Effect, 47 European Economic Review, no. 1 (2003), 165-195. Based on their definition of a
receptive transplant and their classification of a sample of countries, they found a negative
relationship between unreceptive transplants and their constructed index of legality, which in
turn they found has an impact on economic development.
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2 Legal pluralism and the persistence of
pre-colonial institutions
All societies, both across space and time, have had institutions to order social
relations and control anti-social behaviour. The work of Maine,9 Malinowski,10
Diamond11 and others suggests that human behaviour was often tightly regu-
lated prior to the waves of European colonisation, which peaked in the late
nineteenth century and swept much of the world. This is despite many of these
pre-colonial societies being stateless prior to colonisation. Posner12 even sug-
gests that crime rates in stateless societies were equivalent to modern Western
states, despite the use of privately enforced sanctions and very different rules
and procedures including the use of violent retribution, compensation pay-
ments, the use of supernatural divination, and the principles of group liability
and strict liability.
Over the millennia, non-state legal institutions that permitted high magni-
tude sanctions mostly disappeared in Western societies. Tamanaha13 suggests
that in Europe these legal institutions gradually lost their potency and were
eventually downgraded and labelled “norms” or “custom” due to the growth in
state power. However, not long after the state successfully claimed a monopoly
on both law and violence in Europe, colonisation led to a new form of legal
pluralism in many parts of the world, whereby European (criminal) law was
overlaid on pre-existing legal institutions in colonised societies.
In stateless societies, the colonial legal transplants led to a completely new
legal order overlaid on existing tribal (or kinship) structures. In societies that
already had the principles of state (or central) organisation in place, colonisation
often involved co-opting and adapting existing legal structures. For instance,
despite the transplant of English criminal law to the former British colonies of
Papua and Pakistan, their pre-colonial legal systems were very different: Papua
was made up of completely stateless societies where kinship ties and the private
enforcement of retributive sanctions played a central role14; whereas Pakistan,
9 H. Sumner Maine, Ancient Law, 8 The Crayon, no. 4 (1861), 77-80.
10 B. Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 1926).
11 A.S. Diamond, The Evolution of Law and Order (London: Watts & Co., 1951) and A.S.
Diamond, Primitive Law, Past and Present (London: Methuen & Co., 1971).
12 R.A. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 174 et seq.
13 B.Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, 30 Sydney
Law Review (2008), 375-411.
14 P. Lawrence, “The State versus Stateless Societies in Papua and New Guinea”, in P.J. Brown
(ed.), The Fashion of Law in New Guinea (Sydney, NSW: Butterworths, 1969), p. 17 et seq.
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despite being extremely diverse and with tribal regions of its own, had been part
of the Mogul Empire for more than three centuries before English colonisation.
The Mogul Empire had its own complex, albeit decentralised, legal order where,
for instance, executions required approval from central authorities.15
There is considerable evidence that substantive elements of these pre-colo-
nial institutions persist in many post-colonial states, whether they are given
formal acknowledgement by the state or not.16 Acemoglu et al.17 highlight the
fact that in many parts of Africa, the rule of chiefs and their administration
of justice remains a powerful institutional force. Indeed, in some societies non-
state legal institutions continue to play the primary role in the control of crime.18
However, the persistence of non-state legal institutions is not confined to Africa
or even poorly resourced post-colonial states. Knight,19 Bicchieri,20 Greif,21
Aoki,22 and Basu23 have all documented the persistence of powerful non-state
15 H.H. Dodwell, The Cambridge History of India: British India 1497–1858, vol. V (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1929).
16 For a discussion of “surface law” see W. Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law
from a Global Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 293 et seq.
17 D. Acemoglu, T. Reed, and J.A. Robinson, Chiefs: Elite Control of Civil Society and Economic
Development in Sierra Leone, National Bureau of Economic Research, no. w18691 (2013).
18 There is a long list documenting this phenomenon. For instance see E.P. Stringham and C.J.
Miles, Repelling States: Evidence from Upland Southeast Asia, 25 The Review of Austrian
Economics, no. 1 (2011), 17-33; C. Rautenbach and M. Jacques, Common Law Crimes and
Indigenous Customs: Dealing with the Issues in South African Law, 61 Journal of Legal
Pluralism and Unofficial Law (2010), 109-144; M. Forsyth, A Bird that Flies with Two Wings:
Kastom and State Justice Systems in Vanuatu (Canberra, ACT: ANUE-Press, 2009); D.A. Donovan
and G. Assefa, Homicide in Ethiopia: Human Rights, Federalism, and Legal Pluralism, 51 The
American Journal of Comparative Law, no. 3 (2003), 505-552; S.H. Bukurura, Combating Crime
among the Sukuma and Nyamwezi of West-Central Tanzania, 24 Crime, Law and Social Change,
no. 3 (1995), 257-266 and S. Larcom, Taking Customary Law Seriously: A Case of Legal Re-
Ordering in Kieta, 45 The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, no. 2 (2013), 190-208.
19 J. Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
20 C. Bicchieri, The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2006).
21 A. Greif, Institutions and the Path to Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
22 M. Aoki, Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001).
23 K. Basu, Prelude to Political Economy: A Study of the Social and Political Foundations of
Economics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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institutions within states. They can survive despite efforts to dismantle them,
even under a powerful totalitarian state.24 Massell25 documented Soviet attempts
to introduce “revolutionary” state laws and ideals to Soviet Central Asia in the
late 1920s and concluded:
If we consider that the Soviet campaign took place under almost “ideal” conditions – a
determined commitment to revolutionary purposes by a radical modernizing elite; the incum-
bent’s undisputed and centralized political power, overwhelming superiority of force, and
authoritarian dispositions coupled with the absence of democratic constraints; isolated and
small target populations denuded, in large part, of their traditional elites; the incapacity or
unwillingness of neighboring states to intervene in the affairs of their ethnic brethren; and,
therefore, the sponsor-regime’s relative freedom both to initiate and to retreat from a revolu-
tionary experiment – then there are grave questions about the utility of law as an autonomous
strategic instrument of rapid, administered social change under less favorable circumstances.
Massell went on to report that Soviet authorities subsequently retreated from
their attempts to eliminate the pre-existing institutions by winding back enforce-
ment efforts and making both official and unofficial concessions to the non-state
legal orders of the region.
It is noteworthy that in colonial times more generally, while the trans-
planted law was usually applied to the whole colony, in practice, it was often
enforced selectively. In addition to making formal concessions to pre-existing
legal institutions, colonial governments usually made important informal con-
cessions, primarily to maintain public order.26 Tamanaha27 argues that one of
the main ways that post-colonial states continue to deal with persisting elements
24 In some senses this is in opposition to the law and norms literature which often assumes the
omnipotence of the state and rapid evolution. For instance, Posner and Rasmusen (R.A. Posner and
E. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 International
Review of Law and Economics, no. 3 (1999), 382) reach a similar conclusion to Bentham (J.
Bentham, “Place and Time”, in P. Schofield and S.G Engelmann (eds.), Selected Writings: Jeremy
Bentham (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011) suggesting that “bad norms” can simply be
changed by the state by “diminishing the benefits of compliance with such norms by creating
effective legal remedies”. Dharmapala and McAdams (D. Dharmapala and R.H. McAdams, The
Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5
American Law and Economics Review, no. 1 (2003), 1-31) and Geisinger (A. Geisinger, A Belief
Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 Iowa Law Review, no. 1 (2002), 35-73) also highlight the
“expressive” function of state law and suggest the state is able to create and perpetuate norms
through its ability to signal good and bad behaviour and change internalised beliefs.
25 G. Massell, Law as an Instrument of Revolutionary Change in a Traditional Milieu: The Case of
Soviet Central Asia, 2 Law and Society Review, no. 2 (1968), 226.
26 B. Morse and G. Woodman (eds.), Indigenous Law and the State: The Struggle for Indigenous
Rights (Dordrecht: Foris, 1988).
27 See Tamanaha (2008), supra note 13.
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of pre-colonial legal institutions which are either crimes or deemed to breach
human rights is to explicitly condemn them but provide little or no enforcement
effort.
Numerous theories attempt to explain why pre-colonial legal institutions
should persist regardless of state activity directed towards them. Hart28 high-
lights the importance of the internalisation of rules, while Carbonara, Parisi and
Von Wangenheim29 provide a model suggesting that state interventions aimed at
punishing activities that are socially acceptable can be counterproductive and
entrench them through the creation of protest movements. The literature on
clubs, inspired by Buchanan,30 also provides a rationale for the persistence of
non-state institutions, even when they rival or oppose the state.31
3 Types of pre-colonial legal institutions
Drawing on the work of numerous legal scholars and anthropologists,
Diamond32 described and categorised different legal orders from different histor-
ical and geographical settings. His work suggests that the role of the state in
sanctioning wrongdoing varies along a continuum. At one end of his spectrum
were the stateless food gathering societies, while at the other end was the
modern Western state. While suffering from some cultural biases, Diamond33
analysed different legal orders in terms of a number of factors, including:
enforcement, culpability, sanctions, role of the state, and recognition of
property.
28 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961).
29 E. Carbonara, F. Parisi, and G. Von Wangenheim, Unjust Laws and Illegal Norms, 32
International Review of Law and Economics, no. 3 (2012), 285-299.
30 J.M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 Economica, no. 125 (1965), 1-14.
31 For example, Iannaccone (L.R. Innaccone, Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in
Cults, Communes, and Other Religious Collectives, 100 Journal of Political Economy, no. 2
(1992), 271-291) suggests groups may maintain rules that are in direct opposition to the state
in an effort to encourage commitment and reduce defection by members. If members have
broken state laws, defection is less likely as they will likely face punishment by the state
coupled with a loss of protection from the group. Therefore, resisting convergence of rules
makes participation in state-related activities more costly and can lead to a corner solution on
group members.
32 Diamond (1951, 1971), supra note 11.
33 Diamond (1951, 1971), supra note 11.
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A summary of Diamond’s34 analysis of the evolution of law is presented
in Box 1.35 His analysis highlights the evolutionary nature of legal institutions
and how they adapt to social and economic circumstances, while also sug-
gesting that the evolution of legal institutions is slow.36 Most relevant for the
analysis in this article is the relationship between the magnitude and enfor-
cement of non-state sanctions with the growth of the state. In short, non-state
enforcement of high magnitude sanctions, primarily through kinship ties,
slowly gave way to state control both in scope of wrongs and type of
sanction.
Diamond’s37 analysis also suggests that high magnitude state sanctions
substituted for and crowded out non-state sanctions. This was achieved by a
significant increase in the scope of public (criminal) wrongs and the state
eventually outlawing (or tightly regulating) high magnitude non-state sanc-
tions, the most notable being privately enforced violent retribution. During
this evolution, sanctions moved from being seen as righting a wrong for the
individual and kin concerned to being seen as punishments for offences
against the state and society. Zasu38 suggests that this occurred due to
changes in the relative cost of state versus non-state enforcement. He
suggests that as the intensity of kinship ties fall, the relative costs of non-
state law enforcement rise, and so there is an optimal move towards state
enforcement. In summary, this literature suggests that there is a relation-
ship between the ability of non-state enforcement to substitute with state
enforcement and the degree of statelessness.
34 Ibid.
35 Box 1 presents an abbreviated version of Diamond’s (1951, supra note 11) nine
different categories for social and legal institutions prior to what he considered the
modern age: The Food Gatherers, The First Agricultural Grade, The Second Agricultural
Grade, The Hunters, the Cattle Keepers, The Early Codes, The Central Codes, and The Late
Codes.
36 Interestingly Diamond (1951, 1971, supra note 11) suggests a strong relationship between
population density and type of legal institution which is of relevance to Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson (2002, supra note 2) as it questions the validity of their instrument for state
institutions.
37 Diamond (1951, 1971), supra note 11.
38 Y. Zasu, Sanctions by Social Norms and the Law: Substitutes or Complements? 36 Journal of
Legal Studies (2007), 379-396.
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4 Expected interaction of state and non-state
institutions in the control of crime
The previous two sections aimed to highlight the fact that pre-colonial institu-
tions can persist into the post-colonial period and that they varied considerably
from society to society. This section aims to provide a theoretical framework on
how non-state and state institutions are likely to interact with each other in the
control of wrongdoing (crime). This is done to inform the empirical analysis of
the next section.
It is suggested that in almost every society, wrongdoing is punished by both
state and non-state sanctions, but this is especially so in a post-colonial society
subject to a criminal law transplant (a legally pluralistic society).39 In such a
case, the criminal law is not autochthonous, but instead is generated externally
and transplanted.40
In such a legally pluralistic society, we can expect that there will be a list of
wrongs that the two legal orders may wish to sanction. This is likely include the
gravest of all wrongs, such as homicide and rape, but alsomany other lesserwrongs,
such as petty theft and parking infringements. We can also expect the two legal
orders to have somedifferences in the conception ofwrong, in terms ofmagnitude of
gravity, and even cases where some behaviour deemed wrong by one legal order is
not deemed to be wrong by the other (idiosyncratic wrongs). For instance, the state
legal order may deem tax evasion and official corruption to be grave wrongs that
attract highmagnitude sanctions, while the non-state legal ordermay consider such
behaviour as legally neutral and attach no sanction. Similarly, the non-state legal
order may deem sorcery or marriage to certain proscribed persons as grave wrongs
with high magnitude sanctions attached, while the state legal order may consider
them legally neutral and attach no sanction. Therefore, when there are idiosyncratic
39 See Tamanaha (2008), supra note 13 and Zasu (2007), supra note 38.
40 This section provides a stylised analysis of legal pluralism in a post-colony with the aim of
informing the empirical analysis; however, there are two important caveats to this account: (1)
Most majority Muslim states (or states within states, such in the Muslim majority states of
Nigeria) have adopted Islamic criminal law (or principles) in their post-colonial period
(M. Badar, Islamic Law (Shari’a) and the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 24
Leiden Journal of International Law (2011), 411-433). This factor is explicitly controlled for in the
empirical analysis by the inclusion of a variable capturing the percentage of Muslims for each
state. (2) There are also some notable examples of states who adopted a foreign legal order
rather than having it imposed upon on them by a colonial power, most notably Japan
(Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard (2003), supra note 8); however, it should be pointed out that
it was still a small elite who imposed the transplant, albeit a local one.
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wrongs, we can expect that only the legal order that considers the behaviour wrong
would engage in enforcement activity, and this alonewould constitute the aggregate
level of deterrence for this given behaviour.41
For those wrongs that both legal orders consider wrong (common wrongs),
we can expect that the sanction of both legal orders should be non-zero – as
they both seek to punish what they deem to be wrong. How each legal order
responds to the enforcement activity of the other should depend on both the
magnitude and type of sanctions used. When state sanctions and non-state
sanctions are the same or of a similar magnitude, we can expect each legal
order’s sanctions to substitute for one another in providing a deterrent against
wrong doing.42 If each legal order is aiming to provide optimal deterrence
(rather than maximal), it implies that the optimal behaviour (in terms of provid-
ing deterrence) of each legal order is to withdraw enforcement effort when the
other one increases it, and vice versa. This result should occur because the
marginal cost of a legal order’s enforcement efforts will remain the same with
increased enforcement effort of the other, while the marginal benefit will have
fallen. In short, one legal order will respond to replace efforts not supplied by
the other, and the more cost-effective of the two systems is likely to supply the
greater amount of enforcement effort.43
However, from the previous discussion in Section 3 on the types of pre-
colonial institutions we know that while a stateless society may have had
sanctions that were of a similar magnitude for common wrongs, they often
took a very different form and were privately enforced. State sanctions generally
consist of fines, imprisonment, and in some places executions, while non-state
sanctions are likely to consist of large compensation payments and retributive
violence. These differences suggest that enforcement activity of the two legal
orders also has the potential to negatively affect the other. For example, the
41 This is of course unless one legal order adopts the wrongs of the other. When the state does
this, it is often referred to as state legal pluralism. See Morse and Woodman (1988, supra note
26) and Tamanaha (2008, supra note 13) for discussions of the different stances the state can
take towards a non-state legal order.
42 See Black (D. Black, The Behaviour of Law: Special Edition (Bingley: Emerald Group
Publishing, 2010) on the substitutability of “legal” and non-legal sanctions. Zasu (2007, supra
note 38) suggests that over long periods of time the sanctions of internally generated non-state
legal orders should move from being substitutes to complements, that is, they reduce in
magnitude.
43 See Larcom and Swanson (S. Larcom and T. Swanson, Documenting Legal Dissonance:
Regulation of (and by) Payback Killing in Papua New Guinea, Cambridge Land Economy
Working Paper (2013), available at: <http://www.landecon.cam.ac.uk/staff/publications/slar-
com/DocumentingLegalDissonance25March-1.pdf>) for a formal derivation of this result.
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most potent non-state sanctions, retributive violence and compensation
demands, are usually considered crimes by the state and therefore should
increase the costs of both state and non-state enforcement. In addition, for
instance, a police officer may face non-state obligations to protect kin from
state prosecution, meaning that he or she is committing a wrong under one
legal order or the other no matter what s/he does.44 Therefore, while the
sanctions might substitute for one another, the contemporaneous existence of
the state and non-state legal order that generates these high magnitude sanc-
tions is likely to provide negative interaction effects – legal dissonance. Where
these net negative externalities are present, it may be rational for the enforce-
ment levels of both legal orders to be reduced due to the costs that are imposed
on each by the other. This interaction effect can result in an aggregate decline in
enforcement and consequently a higher crime rate.45
5 Empirical analysis
5.1 Empirical strategy
First, the relationship between pre-colonial institutions and the current level of
state enforcement is estimated. The theoretical discussion in Section 4 above
suggests that in countries where pre-colonial institutions were relatively state-
less, non-state sanctions for a given crime should be higher in magnitude, as
there were no state sanctions available. If these institutions persist, at least to
some degree, non-state sanctions in these countries are more able to substitute
for state sanctions in controlling crime but the potential for legal dissonance is
also greater, due to higher enforcement costs for both legal orders and/or lower
enforcement productivity. For both reasons of substitutability and dissonance,
we would expect to see lower state enforcement in countries that were relatively
stateless in pre-colonial times.
Second, while a relationship between the measure for pre-colonial institu-
tions and current state enforcement may suggest that pre-colonial institutions
44 For instance, see Bierschenk’s (T. Bierschenk, The Everyday Functioning of an African Public
Service: Informalization, Privatization and Corruption in Benin’s Legal System, 57 Journal of Legal
Pluralism and Unofficial Law (2008), 101-139, at 132) account of the formal justice system in
Benin that suggests many instances of official “corruption” are actually “the mobilization of
social relations” or non-state obligations being imposed on government officials.
45 For a formal derivation of this result Larcom and Swanson (2013), supra note 43.
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continue to affect current state crime enforcement it does not provide any insight
as to whether this is due to the ability of non-state sanctions to substitute for
state sanctions or whether it is due to dissonance effects. In relation to disso-
nance, states can be expected to have more difficulty in enforcing the law in
countries that were relatively stateless due to kinship networks diluting its
effectiveness, the fact that some pre-colonial practices and sanctions are crimes
themselves, and because the state criminal law may lack legitimacy among the
populace. In addition, as discussed above, the fact that most high magnitude
non-state sanctions in stateless societies are also crimes (labelled homicide,
assault and extortion) the cost of non-state enforcement should be higher due
to the presence of the state criminal law. Therefore, to gain greater insight on the
net effect of state and non-state enforcement, the relationship between pre-
colonial institutions and the measure for crime is estimated. If pre-colonial
legal institutions and the measure for crime have a significant relationship,
this provides an indicator of whether legal dissonance (or consonance) is pre-
sent. Importantly, the estimations both include and exclude the measure for
state law enforcement which helps determine the transmission mechanism of
these effects. If there is a relationship between higher crime and pre-colonial
institutions, but this no longer holds once state enforcement is included in the
estimation, it suggests that this relationship is being driven by the interactions
between non-state and state enforcement. Indeed, it suggests that it is being
driven primarily by changes in state enforcement beyond what would be
expected by substitutability.
5.2 Data
To examine the effects of different types of non-state sanctions on state enforce-
ment and crime control; measures for crime, state enforcement activity, various
controls and pre-colonial institutions are required. The descriptive statistics for
the variables used in the estimations are presented below and the data used in
the estimations can be forwarded on request.
5.2.1 Pre-colonial institutions
The variable pre-colonial measures the degree of centralised authority prior to
colonisation. This is sourced from Müller et al.’s46 Atlas of Pre-colonial Societies:
Cultural Heritage and Social Structures of African, Asian and Melanesian
46 Müller, Marti, Schiedt, and Arpagaus (2000), supra note 6.
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Countries which also sources data on cultural units from Murdock’s47
Ethnographic Atlas. The specific aim of these measures is to provide quantitative
data on institutions, social organisation, and production prior to colonisation.
Importantly therefore, anything deemed to be “imposed” by colonial regimes
were explicitly excluded in the measurement.48 In this sense, the measures
should be exogenous in terms of any mutations caused by European colonisa-
tion; however, it must be acknowledged that unpicking pre-colonial from post-
colonial non-state institutions can be a difficult task.49 In a further effort to
isolate pre-colonial institutions, Mueller et al.’s50 dataset also excludes Europe
and the European settler colonies and the whole of the Americas.51 Specifically,
it only includes countries where people of European origin make up less than
10% of the population, with the exception of South Africa (with 18% of the
population). In addition dependent territories, city states, and micro-countries
are also excluded. In total, data on pre-colonial institutions are available from
86 current African, Asian and Pacific countries.
Specifically, the variable pre-colonial measures jurisdictional hierarchy
beyond the local community. The categorical variables are as follows: 0. No
levels (no political authority beyond community); 1. One level (for example,
petty chiefdoms); 2. Two levels (for example, larger chiefdoms); 3. Three levels
(for example, states or kingdoms); 4. Four levels (for example, more powerful
states with multiple tiers of governance). In terms of social and ethnic groups, it
is well known that colonisation led to the creation of nation states with arbitrary
borders. Indeed, this has been exploited by Sachs and Warner52 and Brock and
Durlauf53 to suggest that ethnic conflict may be an important determinant of
economic growth. Therefore, to account for internal diversity within nations,
47 G.P. Murdock, Ethnographic Atlas (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969).
48 Ibid., at 52. The local group level data are generated from Murdock’s documentation of 1267
societies is generated by descriptions of anthropologists during colonial times, mainly between
1890 and 1950.
49 For instance, see Chanock’s (M. Chanock, Law, Custom and Social Order (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998)) criticism of the very concept of customary law.
50 Müller, Marti, Schiedt, and Arpagaus (2000), supra note 6.
51 Ziltener and Müller (2007, supra note 7, p. 385) conclude that “the dominant social institu-
tions [in Central and South America] are predominately western.”
52 J.D. Sachs and A.M. Warner, Fundamental Sources of Long-Run Growth, 87 The American
Economic Review, no. 2 (1997), 184-188.
53 W.A. Brock and S.N. Durlauf,What Have We Learned from a Decade of Empirical Research on
Growth? Growth Empirics and Reality, 15 The World Bank Economic Review, no. 2 (2001),
229-272.
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Muller et al.’s54 pre-colonial institutions data are measured at the local group
level: individual tribes, communities, and cultural units, which are then
weighted by population, and aggregated at the national level.55 The population
weighted measure for each country is therefore a continuous variable with the
range of 0 to 4. The theoretical discussion predicts that the lower the degree of
centralised authority (the closer the rank is to zero), the higher the magnitude of
non-state sanctions and the propensity to use them.
5.2.2 Crime
The measure for crime, homocides, is homicides per capita. This measure is
chosen for both conceptual and practical reasons. Conceptually, homicide
(when not used as a punishment or during war) is assumed to be a wrong
under both state and non-state legal institutions, that is, it is a common wrong
across the dataset.56
The data source for homicides per capita is the World Health Organisation’s
(WHO) estimated homicide rate for member countries from their Burden of
Disease data. This is an estimate of total deaths per population (‘000) by
intentional injury (violence) for 192 member states and excludes deaths from
both war (including civil war) and suicide. Measuring crime across countries is
notoriously difficult; however, these data represent WHO estimates and aim to
reconcile data from multiple sources, primarily from medical practitioners
(death certificates) and state law enforcement sources, with the explicit aim of
allowing for cross-country comparability. The WHO data are used in preference
to state law enforcement data due to a potential bias in the latter generated from
54 Müller, Marti, Schiedt, and Arpagaus (2000), supra note 6.
55 The weightings use populations for the year 1965.
56 While it is true that some non-state legal institutions do consider homicide as a legitimate
sanction, so do many state legal regimes in this sample of countries. According to Amnesty
International (Amnesty International, Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries (2009), available at:
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries>, accessed 1
June 2013) these include Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Botswana, Chad, China,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Malaysia,
Nigeria, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Syria,
Taiwan, Thailand, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Given the lack of
empirical support for state sanctioned homicides leading to lower crime rates (see S.D. Levitt
and T.J. Miles, Empirical Study of Criminal Punishment, in A.M. Polinsky and S. Shavell (eds.),
Handbook of Law and Economics, vol. I (Amsterdam: Elsevier, North-Holland) the use of the
death penalty by the state was not included in the estimations.
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under-reporting where non-state enforcement is higher.57 While consistent victi-
misation studies across countries would be the ideal measure (for example van
Dijk et al.’s58 International Crime Victimisation Surveys (ICVS)), it would restrict
the scope of the data analysis to a handful of countries given their focus on
developed countries.
5.2.3 State enforcement
The measure of the intensity of state law enforcement used is, relprison, which is
prisoners per homicide. Incarceration statistics collated by the International
Centre of Prison Studies59 are used. This dataset contains the number of prison-
ers held in 218 independent countries and dependent territories and therefore
provides a measure for enforcement that accounts for both probability and
magnitude.60 Importantly, this is a measure for state law enforcement output
rather than input (such as policing). To account for the relative enforcement
output given the level of crime (to measure enforcement intensity), the variable
relprison is constructed which is the number of incarcerations divided by the
crime rate (as measured by homicides). Clearly, unless homicides make up the
same proportion of crime per capita in each country, this is only a proxy for
relative enforcement effort and likely to be noisy. However, disaggregated crime
data and prison data are unavailable so this is unavoidable.61 While this variable
57 It should be noted that data from medical practitioners might also vary with the reach of the
state. Cole and Gramajo (2009, supra note 3) suggest that if there is a bias it is not significant as
many of the poorest countries (with relatively smaller states) in the dataset have high homicide
rates. However, if there is a bias in regard to the reach of the state, it provides an additional
control on the estimations as it would effectively provide homicides given the reach of the state.
58 J.van Dijk, J. van Kesteren, and P. Smit, Criminal Victimisation in International Perspective,
Key Findings from the 2004–2005 ICVS and EU ICS (The Hague: Boom Legal Publishers, 2008).
59 International Centre of Prison Studies,World Prison Population List (8th ed., 2009), available
at: <http://www.prisonstudies.org/publications/list/40-world-prison-population-list-8th-edi-
tion.html>, accessed March 2013.
60 While policing per capita would provide a measure for enforcement input, consistent data
that overlap with the sample countries for pre-colonial institutions data are unavailable. The
United Nations, Survey for Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Systems (2011), available
at: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/United-Nations-Surveys-on-Crime-
Trends-and-the-Operations-of-Criminal-Justice-Systems.html>, accessed December 2012 overlaps
with less than 30 countries from this sample.
61 There is evidence that violent crime and other types of crime are highly correlated over time
(see A.K. Dills, J.A. Miron, and G. Summers, “What Do Economists Know about Crime?” in R. di
Tella, S. Edwards, and E. Schargrodsky (eds.), The Economics of Crime: Lessons for and from
Latin America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), p. 269 et seq.).
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is expected to contain some noise, there is no apparent reason for it to be biased
in relation to state and non-state enforcement. As can be seen in Figure A1, there
is a clear negative relationship between (log) prisoners per homicide and the
(log) homicide rate for all the data points available for these variables. This is
the relationship to be expected under standard deterrence models (see Becker,
1968 and Polinsky and Shavell, 2000) and incapacitation effects, noting however
the potential for endogeneity.
5.2.4 Control variables
Based on the literature (see Soares62 and Cole and Gramajo63), a number of the
control variables used have been found to be significant in previous cross-
country studies. These include income inequality (Gini), logged gross national
income per capita (lincome), percent of urbanised population (Urban), ethnic
fractionalisation (Avelf), and religious variables (Catholic and Muslim). In addi-
tion, an Africa dummy (Africa) and measure for the relative size of the state
(Govtexp) were also included in the estimations. Finally, controls for legal
origins were also included (legalor_uk and legalor_fr).
5.3 Econometric results
5.3.1 Relationship between pre-colonial legal institutions and state
enforcement
The theoretical discussion earlier suggests that countries that had pre-colonial
institutions that were relatively stateless should have lower levels of current
state law enforcement, while controlling for other factors. Table 2 presents the
OLS estimations for the model of best fit.64 As can be seen, there is a strong
significant positive relationship between the measure for pre-colonial institu-
tions, pre-colonial and intensity of state enforcement, lrelprison (log prisoners
per homicide). This suggests that a higher degree of centralised authority prior
62 Soares (2004), supra note 3.
63 Cole and Gramajo (2009), supra note 3.
64 Consistent with the literature, the variables measuring state enforcement (relprison), homi-
cides per capita (homicides) and income per capita (income) are logged, which also helps to
minimise the effect of outliers. The robustness of the results, including functional from, is
discussed following a discussion of the results.
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to colonisation sees higher current levels of state law enforcement. Conversely,
countries that were relatively stateless in pre-colonial times have lower levels of
state enforcement. This relationship holds when controlled for by income, level
of crime, religious/cultural and geographical factors, legal origins, and size of
government. It is also noteworthy that the measures for income and crime all
have a statistically significant relationship, as would be expected. Perhaps the
only surprising result is the variable Africa which is positive and significant at
the 10% level when not controlling for the size of government.
In relation to legal origins, it can be seen that these variables are consis-
tently insignificant across these estimations and those presented below. From
the theoretical discussion above, this is not surprising. Indeed, it supports the
claim made here that in relation to criminal law, colonisation led to almost
identical legal regimes being imposed on a diverse set of pre-existing legal
institutions. As this inquiry focuses on crime control, these results should not
be taken to be inconsistent with LLSV65 as their transmission mechanism related
to investor protection, a very different area of law. However, it does suggest
some limitations to the explanatory power of common versus civil law
transplants.
Most importantly, these estimations suggest that where the propensity for
the enforcement of high magnitude non-state sanctions is higher, government
enforcement is relatively lower. However, they do not provide any insight into
whether this relationship capturing substitutability between state and non-state
sanctions or dissonance effects. To shed more light on this result, the relation-
ship enforcement and the crime rate is estimated.
5.3.2 Crime and punishment
In order to gain a better understanding of what is behind the decrease in state
crime enforcement in countries that had relatively stateless legal institutions,
the relationship between pre-colonial and lhomicides (log homicides per capita)
is estimated. First, the relationship between pre-colonial and lhomicides is esti-
mated without state enforcement and then with state enforcement.
The reason for this approach is that if states are merely withdrawing enfor-
cement due to the availability of a costless substitute (high magnitude non-state
sanctions), the measure for pre-colonial institutions should have no relationship
65 La Porta, López de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), supra note 1; R. La Porta, F. Lopes-
De-Silanes, and A. Scheifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 Journal of
Economic Literature, no. 2 (2008), 285-332.
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on the crime rate, once controlled for other relevant variables. However, the fact
that countries that were relatively stateless have lower levels of state enforce-
ment also has to be taken into account. Therefore, the relationship between pre-
colonial institutions and homicides per capita that includes the state enforce-
ment is also estimated. If the relationship between homicides per capita and
state enforcement is significant, but the measure for pre-colonial institutions is
no longer significant, this suggests that the crime rate is primarily determined
through state enforcement and the interaction effect with non-state enforcement.
That is, it would suggest the role of non-state enforcement in relation to crime is
primarily an indirect one, given we already know that there is a strong relation-
ship between the degree of pre-colonial statelessness and the intensity of state
crime enforcement.
As can be seen from the estimations presented in Table 3, the measure for
pre-colonial institutions has a significant negative relationship with homicides
per capita when the measure for state enforcement is absent. The first equation
suggests that, on the whole, countries that were relatively stateless in pre-
colonial times have higher homicides per capita. The following estimated equa-
tions suggest that this relationship is quite robust even when controlling for
other factors that are known to be related to cross-country crime rates, including
inequality, income and ethnic fractionalisation. However, the coefficient for pre-
colonial institutions halves in magnitude once these other variables are taken
into account. In Equation 8 that includes all controls (except measures for state
enforcement) only pre-colonial and gini remaining statistically significant at the
10% level.
Interestingly, the measure for ethno-linguistic fractionalisation (avelf) is
insignificant in the presence of a measure for pre-colonial institutions despite
often being linked to conflict and a lack of trust (see Easterly and Levine,66
Alesina et al.67 and Ruddell68). These two variables are closely related with a
correlation coefficient of 0.62. As can be seen from Equations 4 and 5, when
ethnic fractionalisation is included in the estimations, while the coefficient for
pre-colonial increases slightly, so does the standard error, reducing its signifi-
cance to the 10% level. While not reported, when the measure for pre-colonial
institutions is excluded from the estimations, the measure for ethnic
66 W. Easterly and R. Levine, Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions, 112 The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, no. 4 (1997), 1203-1250.
67 A. Alesina, A. Devleeschauwer, W. Easterly, S. Kurlat, and R. Wacziarg, Fractionalization, 8
Journal of Economic Growth, no. 2 (2003), 155-194.
68 R. Ruddell and M.G. Urbina, Minority Threat and Punishment: A Cross-National Analysis, 21
Justice Quarterly, no. 4 (2004), 903-931.
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fractionalisation is significant at the 10% level. This result suggests at least four
possibilities: first that the measure for pre-colonial institutions is actually a
proxy for ethno-linguistic fractionalisation, second that ethno-linguistic fractio-
nalisation is actually a proxy for persistent pre-colonial institutions, third that
the two variables are randomly correlated, or fourth that the two variables are
different but related concepts. It is suggested that the two variables are indeed
different but that they should be related. As highlighted by Diamond69 pre-
viously stateless communities were smaller and more tightly knit and therefore
we would expect a state comprising a collection of such communities to be more
heterogeneous in terms of identity and language. This reasoning suggests that
ethnic fractionalisation may be capturing elements of persistent pre-colonial
institutions. Importantly, when both measures are included, pre-colonial dom-
inates in terms of both magnitude and statistical significance. It should also be
noted that in Equation 7 (log) income per capita is no longer significant when
urbanisation (urban) is taken into account, suggesting multicolinearity between
these variables, which is not surprising given that urbanisation and population
density is sometimes used as a proxy for income (for example, Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson70).
As can be seen from Table 4, once the measure for the intensity of state
enforcement is accounted for, the relationship between pre-colonial and lhomi-
cides is no longer statistically significant and that the coefficient for pre-colonial
does switch from negative to positive. While this suggests that the measures for
non-state enforcement and state enforcement are negatively correlated, which
we already know, it also provides two other important insights.
First, it suggests that the type of non-state legal institution primarily affects
the homicide rate indirectly through its impact on state enforcement, as pre-
dicted by the theoretical discussion above. That is, in countries where pre-
colonial institutions were more stateless, current state enforcement is lower,
and beyond what would be expected by substitutability, as crime is higher in
these countries in an absolute sense. We can also see, and as predicted by the
law and economics literature, the intensity of state enforcement has a strong
negative relationship on homicides per capita, which may be delivered by either
deterrence or incapacitation, or most likely a combination of the two (see Levitt
and Miles71 for a theoretical and empirical discussion on these two effects).
Endogeneity surrounding estimations of law enforcement and crime rates is
notorious, given that higher crime rates may also lead to increased enforcement
69 Diamond (1951, 1971), supra note 11.
70 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002), supra note 2.
71 Levitt and Miles, supra note 56.
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activity; however, these results are plausible and correctly signed. They suggest
that a 1% increase in prisoners per homicide leads to an approximately 0.7%
decrease in the homicide rate. Most importantly, these results provide strong
suggestive evidence that negative interaction effects generated by high magni-
tude non-state sanctions (and the institutions that accompany them) leads to an
overall increase in the homicide rate, primarily driven by reduced state enforce-
ment which is in itself effective in reducing crime.
Second, while pre-colonial is no longer statistically significant when state
enforcement is included in the estimations, due to both a fall in the magnitude
of the coefficients and an increase in their standard errors, the coefficients for
this variable move from being negative to positive. This suggests that once the
effect of state enforcement is controlled for, which albeit itself depends on pre-
colonial, the degree of relative statelessness has a negative effect on crime
(lhomicides). This result is consistent with the theoretical discussion as relatively
stateless societies had relatively higher magnitude privately enforced sanctions,
which if they persist to some degree, should provide a greater deterrent against
the measure for crime. However, as stated earlier the results also suggest that
the net effect of these type of legal institutions is an increase in crime due to
lower levels of state enforcement.
One caveat to this analysis is that pre-colonial could also be capturing pre-
ferences (or tolerance levels) towards homicide and if this was the case, it would
provide an alternative explanation for reduced government enforcement other than
negative interaction effects. However, there are two reasons why this explanation
is unlikely. The first is that there is some evidence (see Posner72) to suggest that
stateless societies had similar crime rates to those in Western states during the
twentieth Century, although this is contested.73 The second reason is that while the
desired level of crime is not known, this should be captured by the various control
variables, including income, income inequality and religious/cultural and geogra-
phical factors. Of these control variables, it is also noteworthy that they are
consistent with the literature, with the measure for inequality gini having a
significant positive relationship. Also, consistent with the findings of Soares74 the
religious variables show some degree of significance, while income does not.
72 Posner (1983), supra note 12.
73 Pinker (S. Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: The Decline of Violence in History and Its
Causes (Penguin: London, 2011)) argues that stateless societies had higher levels of violence
(but includes both crime and war to get this result). Even so, he suggests that this was due to
the state’s lack of monopoly on violence and not a result of socialisation or genetics (that is, not
preferences).
74 Soares (2004), supra note 3.
Pre-colonial Institutions and Crime 51
Brought to you by | School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/25/19 2:43 PM
Finally, while there may be a temptation to use the measure for pre-colonial
legal institutions as an instrumental variable for state enforcement, this is
ruled out on both theoretical and empirical grounds. The theoretical under-
pinnings of this article are that both state and non-state sanctions can both
be an effective source of crime control, but that presence of each will affect
the other. In particular, it is found that state enforcement is lower where
high magnitude privately enforced sanctions should be more present.
However, for the variable pre-colonial to be a valid instrument for state enforce-
ment, there must be no reason that non-state institutions should directly affect
the level of crime, other than through the effect on state enforcement.
Theoretically, this is not the case given that non-state enforcement should
influence the level of crime through its own deterrence effects. Empirically,
there is some weak support for this, as once controlling for state enforcement
pre-colonial is correctly signed, suggesting it may have an effect, albeit a
statistically insignificant one.
5.3.3 Robustness of results
As can be viewed from Tables 2, 3 and 4, the relationship between pre-colonial
institutions, state enforcement and the homicide rate is resilient across a range
of estimations, control variables and number of observations. While logged
versions of relprison, homicides, and income are used, as a test for robustness,
different functional forms were also estimated with broadly similar results,
however in some estimations pre-colonial lost its significance when logged.
While the analysis of Diamond75 is silent on the functional form, this analysis
suggests that the relationship takes a linear-log form. Given that there may be
some scepticism about the constructed variable lrelprison, as a further test for
the robustness, the variable of lprisoners (prisoners per capita) was also esti-
mated as an alternative and the estimations can be found in the Appendix.
While the measure for state enforcement no longer has relationship with homi-
cides per capita (which is to be expected as it is not a relative measure), it can be
seen that the pre-colonial variable remains highly significant in terms of both
state enforcement and crime. Overall the relationship between the variable pre-
colonial has a robust relationship with measures for state crime enforcement and
crime.
75 Diamond (1951, 1971), supra note 11.
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6 Conclusion
The key finding of this article is that the type of pre-colonial legal institution
has a clear relationship with current state crime control and crime rates. In
particular, countries that were relatively stateless prior to colonisation have
lower levels of state enforcement and higher crime rates, with a variety of
controls in place. This provides suggestive evidence that negative interaction
effects generated by high magnitude non-state sanctions (and the institu-
tional infrastructure that accompanies them) leads to an overall increase in
the crime rate, primarily driven by reduced state enforcement.
This result is achieved by exploiting differences in pre-colonial institu-
tions and, in effect, making the assumption that colonial institutions were
identical. In taking this approach, the study inverts the legal origins and
institutions literature, which assumes that pre-colonial institutions were iden-
tical and exploits differences in colonial institutions. However, as in the legal
origins and institutions literature, it has been assumed that the institutions of
interest, pre-colonial legal institutions, persist. The fact that legal institutions
varied considerably across societies prior to colonisation and persist today is
well known in the legal pluralism literature.
While non-state legal institutions are shown to play an important role,
the results suggest that state criminal enforcement is a more powerful force
than private enforcement in controlling homicides. However, if negative
interaction effects are indeed driving lower levels of state and non-state
enforcement output, this is not something that may be easily solved.
Indeed where there are high negative interaction effects generated by private
enforcement, it may be both rational and optimal for the state to withdraw
enforcement. If this were the case, it provides for the possibility for a
“high crime-low enforcement trap” generated by persistent pre-colonial
institutions – legal dissonance.
Given that the variable for pre-colonial institutions is to some degree exo-
genous, in that the measure aims to exclude any colonial influences on non-
state institutions, a degree of causality can be claimed from these results.
However, some caution is necessary, given that the data were compiled by
colonial scholars and anthropologists, at different times, with their own cultural
biases. Nonetheless, this approach of accounting for the persistent non-state
legal institutions, and legal pluralism more generally, helps provide an explana-
tion for the well-known large variations in state crime control and crime across
countries.
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